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RECENT STATUTES
DomzsTic RELATIONS-ALMONY IN ANNULMENT ACTIONs.-By reason of two re-
cent amendments to the Civil Practice Act,' the law of New York relative to the
award of alimony in annulment actions appears to have undergone a substantial
change. The new statutes provide for the award of alimony (temporary and perma-
nent) to the wife when an action is brought to annul a marriage or to declare the
nullity of a void marriage. 2 Since the new acts are not the result of any statutory
development, this being the first legislative expression on the subject, a knowledge of
the case law existing on this topic when the amendment was adopted is necessary in
order to determine the changes wrought by the statute in the New York rules concern-
ing the award of alimony in annulment actions.
Alimony is generally considered as the allowance which a husband may be com-
pelled to pay for the support and maintenance of the wife while she is living apart
from him or has been divorced.3 The alimony awarded may be of two kinds: (1)
temporary alimony or alimony pendente lite, and (2) permanent alimony, the former
being the allowance for the wife's support during the pendency of the action4 while
permanent alimony is the allowance made after the termination of the action.5
As the award of alimony is founded on the common law obligation of the husband
to provide support for the wife,6 a huisband, in the absence of express statutory pro-
vision, is not entitled to any alimony 7 because at common law there was no obligation
1. N. Y. Laws 1940, c. 226, §§ 2, 3, effective September 1, 1940, amending the Civil
Practice Act by inserting a new section, § 1140-a, and amending § 1169 of the Civil Prac-
tice Act.
2. N. Y. Crv. PRAc. ACT § 1140-a reads in part: "Maintenance and support of wife in
action for annulment of marriage or to declare the nullity of a void marriage. When an
action is brought to annul a marriage or to declare the nullity of a void marriage, the court
may give such direction for support of the wife by the husband as justice requires....
This section shall apply to any action brought by either the husband or the wife or by any
other person in the lifetime of both parties to the marriage."
N. Y. Cirv. PRAc. ACT § 1169 concerning alimony and expenses pendente lite, and formerly
applicable only to actions for divorce or separation has been amended to include annul-
ment actions and actions to declare the nullity of a void marriage.
3. Stivers v. Wise, 18 App. Div. 316, 46 N. Y. Supp. 9 (2d Dep't 1897); Merriman v.
Hawbaker, 5 F. Supp. 432, 433 (E. D. Ill. 1934); Anderson v. Anderson, 140 Okl. 168,
282 Pac. 335, 337 (1929); 1 BIsHOp, MARRAGE, DIVORCE AND SEPARATION (1891) § 1386.
4. MADDEN, PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1931) 325; Wohlfort v. Wohlfort, 116
Kan. 154, 158, 225 Pac. 746, 749 (1924). Counsel fees are also usually awarded the wife
in a proper case and are generally governed by the same rules applicable to the allowance
of temporary alimony.
5. 1 BISHOP, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND SEPARATION (1891) § 1386; Hornsby v. Hornsby,
187 S. C. 463, 198 S. E. 29, 31 (1938). The term "permanent alimony" is not used to indi-
cate the amount or time of payment; it does not mean "unending" or lifelong; rather as the
alimony awarded at the termination of the suit, it is labeled "permanent" as distinguished
from the alimony awarded while the action is pending which is designated as "temporary".
Soule v. Soule, 4 Cal. App. 97, 87 Pac. 205, 208 (1906).
6. Robertson v. Brewer, 88 N. H. 455, 456, 190 Atl. 709, 710 (1937); Winchester v.
Winchester, 138 Md. 95, 113 Atl. 584 (1921); 2 BIsHoP, MiRRIAGE, DivoRca AND SEPARATION
(1891) § 829.
7. MADDEN, PERsONs AND DduzSTIC RELATIONS (1931) 325; 1 BISHOP, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE
AND SEPARATION (1891) § 1387; see Comment (1923) 32 Y.ALE L. J. 478.
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on the wife's part to support the husband.8 Section 1140-a makes no change in this
rule as it expressly provides the direction by the court is to be "for support of the
wife by the husband". 9
Another characteristic of alimony is that being based on the theory of providing
maintenance for the wife either pending the suit or upon termination of the suit,
it follows that alimony will be refused when the wife's separate estate produces
sufficient income to support her.' 0 The amendment makes no change here either since
the direction for support is to be "as justice requires".
The real problem created by the amendment, however, is to determine in what
situations will alimony (temporary or permanent) be awarded the wife, assuming she
is unable to provide for herself.
Previously, by statute in New York, permanent alimony could be awarded only
to the plaintiff wife in an action for divorce or separation.'1 Temporary alimony and
counsel fees were provided for the wife either plaintiff or defendant in an action
for divorce or separation. 12 But there was no provision at all for the award of ali-
mony, permanent or temporary, to the wife in an annulment action. Yet despite
this absence of statutory provision, the courts, nevertheless, held that the power
to award the wife alimony and counsel fees pendente lite could be exercised as an in-
cident to the jurisdiction conferred on the court.'8
Since the basis for the allowance of alimony, however, is the duty of the husband
to support the wife and since this duty arises from the existence of the marriage rela-
tionship,14 it has been firmly established that permanent alimony, in the absence of
statute, cannot be awarded in an annulment action' 5 because " . . . obviously, if the
8. Greene v. Greene, 49 Neb. 546, 68 N. W. 947, 949 (1896) ; 1 BisHop, MuuIAGE, DIVORCE
Am SEPARATION (1891) § 1184.
9. It should be noted, however, that there are fifteen statutes which allow the court to
award the wife's property to the husband. 2 VERN= , AmEPcAw FAMILY LAWS (1931) pp.
303-308. See also Note (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 478.
10. "The fact that a wife is destitute of means to carry on her suit and to support herself
during its pendency is as essential as any other fact, to authorize the court to award tem-
porary alimony". Collins v. Collins, 80 N. Y. 1, 13 (1880) ; Romaine v. Chauncey, 129 N. Y.
566, 570, 29 N. E. 826, 827 (1892); Arado v. Arado, 281 Ill. 123, 117 N. E. 816 (1917).
11. N. Y. Civ. PRAC. ACT H8 1155, 1164, 1170. In New York City, a wife may obtain a
Family Court order for support without bringing a suit for separation or divorce. N. Y.
DoM. REL. CT. ACT § 91 (1), § 92 (1) as amended by N.Y. Laws, c. 346, § 6, § 92 (3) (6),
§ 101 (1). See also N. Y. CrnDREN's CT. Acv (1922) § 6 (2) as amended by N. Y. Laws
1930, c. 393, and N. Y. Laws 1939, c. 749.
12. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 1169. The amendment does not change this provision.
13. Higgins v. Sharp, 164 N. Y. 4, 58 N. E. 9 (1900) (temporary alimony and counsel
fees) ; Griffin v. Griffin, 47 N. Y. 134 (1872) (counsel fees and expenses) ; Kiel v. Kiel, 146
Misc. 333, 261 N. Y. Supp. 162 (Sup. Ct. 1932) (temporary alimony and counsel fees). A
similar result, in the absence of express statute, has been reached in other jurisdictions.
State ex rel. Wooten v. District Ct., 57 Mont. 517, 189 Pac. 233 (1920) (temporary alimony,
counsel fees and expenses) ; Dunphy v. Dunphy, 161 Cal. 87, 118 Pac. 445 (1911) (expenses);
Webb v. Brooke, 144 Mich. 674, 108 N. W. 358 (1906) (counsel fees).
14. See note 6 supra. See also Whitebird v. Luckey, 180 Okla. 1, 2, 67 P. (2d) 775,
777 (1937) where the court said the allowance of alimony " ... is based upon the marriage
contract. The marriage relation created by contract imposes the duty to support."
15. Park v. Park, 24 Misc. 372, 53 N. Y. Supp. 677 (Sup. Ct. 1898) ; Whitebird v. Luckey,
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woman be not his wife, she can have no claim to alimony... 2).'1 Some jurisdictions
changed the rule by statute17 while one, at least, rejected it entirely without the aid
of statute.' 8
The reasoning behind the refusal of permanent alimony, m annulment actions was
similar to that followed in formulating the rule as to temporary alimony. New York
had held that if the wife brought an action for annulment, alimony pendente lite would
be denied because in bringing her action she was denying the existence of the marital
relationship-the very relationship that was the foundation of her right to support.' 9
Here, too, some states changed the rule by statute and granted alimony and expenses
pendente lite to the wife bringing the annulment action.20
An action by husband to annul the marriage was put on a different basis. There
the wife in defending the action was awarded temporary alimony and counsel fees
because as defendant she was asserting, rather than denying, the existence of the
marriage.2 ' Yet even where the wife was defending the annulment action, if the exis-
180 Okla. 1, 67 P. (2d) 775 (1937); Wigder v. Wigder, 188 At. 235 (N. J. 1936); Werner
v. Werner, 59 Kan. 399, 53 Pac. 127, 128 (1898); Fuller v. Fuller, 33 Kan. 582, 7 Pac. 241
(1885). Notes (1919) 4 A. L. R. 926, (1937) 110 A. L. R. 1283.
16. Park v. Park, 24 Misc. 372, 373, 53 N. Y. Supp. 677 (Sup. Ct. 1898). See also
Willits v. Willits, 76 Neb. 228, 231, 107 N. W. 379, 381 (1906) where the court said:
"Permanent alimony is a statutory innovation, and we find no statutory authority for its
allowance in a suit brought to annul a voidable marriage."
17. Bickford v. Bickford, 74 N. H. 448, 69 At. 579 (1908); Stapleberg v. Stapleberg,
77 Conn. 31, 58 AtI. 233 (1904); Huffman v. Huffman, 47 Ore. 610, 86 Pac. 593 (1906);
Wheeler v. Wheeler, 79 Wisc. 303, 48 N. W. 260 (1891); Barber v. Barber, 74 Iowa 301, 37
N. W. 381 (1888).
For collection of state statutes providing for permanent alimony for the wife, see 1
VERN=, AmyPRcAAr FAnxmy LAWS (1931) 266-272.
18. Strode v. Strode, 3 Bush 227, 96 Am. Dec. 211 (Ky. 1867). The action apparently
was for a divorce but is frequently cited for the proposition that permanent alimony can
be awarded in an annulment action. See Whitebird v. Luckey, 180 Okla. 1, 3, 67 P. (2d)
775, 777 which so cites the Kentucky case.
19. Matter of Micale, 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 321 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Bartlett v. Bartlett, 1
Clarke Ch. 460 (N. Y. 1841); Herron v. Herron, 28 Misc. 323, 59 N. Y. Supp. 861 (Sup.
Ct. 1899); Jones v. Brinsmade, 183 N. Y. 258, 76 N. E. 22 (1905); Heafey v. Heafey, 142
Misc. 147, 254 N. Y. Supp. 82, (Sup. Ct. 1931). This was so whether she alleged the marriage
was void or merely voidable because when a voidable marriage is annulled, it is held to have
been null from the beginning. Matter of Moncrief, 235 N. Y. 390, 139 N. E. 550 (1921).
See Note (1930) 30 COL. L. Rav. 877. -
20. Leckney v. Leckney, 26 R. I. 441, 59 Atl. 311 (1904); Arey v. Arey, 22 Wash. 261,
60 Pac. 724 (1900) ; Lea v. Lea, 104 N. C. 603; 10 S. E. 488 (1889).
In some states, the statutes while not specifically designated as being applicable to
annulment actions are applied to situations which in New York would be an action either
to annul the marriage or to declare the nullity of a void marriage. LAw REwsIoN Com-
msso-, LaGis. Doc. (1940) No. 65 (H) 19-20, 44.
21. Plair v. Plair, 169 Misc. 959, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 824 (Sup. Ct. 1938); North v. North,
1 Barb. Ch. 241, 43 Am. Dec. 778 (N. Y. 1845); Griffin v. Griffin, 47 N. Y. 134 (1872);
Higgins v. Sharp, 164 N. Y. 4, 58 N. E. 9 (1900). The same rule was applied in other
jurisdictions. Lee v. Lee, 191 Ark. 163, 83 S. W. (2d) 840 (1935); McMurray v. Mc-
Murray, 58 Mont. 229, 190 Pac. 924 (1920); Prine v. Prine, 36 Fla. 676, 18 So. 781 (1895);
Vroom v. Marsh, 29 N. J. Eq. 15 (1878); Hunt v. Hunt, 23 Okl. 490, 100 Pac. 541 (1909).
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tence of the marriage was not established or if she admitted its nullity, she was re-
fused both alimony and counsel fees.22
In brief, when the amendments were adopted, the rule in New York and the ma-
jority of other jurisdictions having no statute on the subject, could be summarized
thus: In annulment actions, permanent alimony could not be awarded in any case;
temporary alimony and counsel fees could be awarded if the husband brought the
action to annul and the wife denied the invalidity of the marriage; but temporary
alimony and counsel fees could not be awarded if the wife, in an action by the hus-
band, admitted the invalidity of the marriage or if the existence of the marriage was
not established, or if the wife herself brought the action to annul the marriage.
Applying the amendments to the rules thus stated, it is obvious that substantial
changes are made. Clearly a wife can now obtain permanent alimony in an annulment
action and evidently it matters not that the wife may be the guilty party. Not only
is no reference made to the guilt or innocence of the parties but the statute, being made
expressly applicable "to any action brought by either the husband or the wife",
necessarily contemplates a situation where the wife may be the guilty one.
Previously, a .wife was denied permanent alimony, not because she may have
been at fault but rather because the annulment decree declared the basis for the
award (a marriage) never existed. Apparently all the amendment does is remove this
requirement concerning the marriage relationship. Therefore, the wife's guilt or
innocence being immaterial before the amendment, her guilt or innocence should con-
tinue to be immaterial unless the statute by its terms limits a recovery to an innocent
wife. But if it were intended to penalize a wife for her guilt, why was the amend-
ment (awarding alimony) expressly worded to include a defendant wife? If that were
intended why was not Section 1140-a patterned after the divorce statutes which de-
cree permanent alimony only to the plaintiff-wife?
It is submitted the failure of the legislature to insert this simple provision as to
the wife's guilt being a bar to relief, renders extremely possible the award of alimony
to a wife who is the cause of the marriage being void or voidable.
The provision, however, that the award is to be "as justice requires" may furnish a
loophole. This phrase, as used in the divorce and separation sections, refers to the
ground of the court's discretion, which discretion extends to the amount of the
award.23 So construed, the phrase does not mean "shall relief be given?" but "how
much relief shall be given?" While thus interpreted, the phrase would be of little
aid in denying alimony to a guilty wife, still the courts may seize upon it as a means
to refuse relief to a wife whose conduct is "unjust".
Situations where an award to the wife would be unfair can easily be imagined. Con-
sider the case where the wife obtains a void foreign divorce, subsequently remarries,
and her "second husband" brings suit for annulment. If the statute is read literally,
she will be entitled to alimony. That hardly seems just especially where the "second
husband" is entirely innocent. The Law Revision Commission noted that the existing
rule in New York resulted in injustice to the innocent wife2 but that is no excuse
for going to the opposite extreme and creating a rule that will result in injustice to the
22. Meredith v. Shakespeare, 97 W. Va. 514, 125 S. E. 374, 375 (1924); Hopper v.
Hopper, 92 Hun 415 (N. Y. 1895); Appleton v. Warner, 51 Barb. 270 (N. Y. 1868); Freeman
v. Freeman, 49 N. J. Eq. 102, 23 Atl. 113 (1891); Sims v. Sims, 122 Miss. 745, 85 So. 73
(1920).
23. LAW Rzvmsiox Comi-Assiox, LEois. Doc. (1940) No. 65 (H) 59.
24. LAW RmViSsox CoianssioN, Lzors. Doc. (1940) No. 65 (H) 9.
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innocent husband. Unless the phrase "as justice requires" is used by the court
as a discretionary ground for granting or refusing relief in the first instance, the result
indicated may well be expected from a literal reading of the statute.
The statutes of some states settle the problem by limiting the award of compensa-
tion to those free from guilt.25 The English statute, on the other hand,26 does not
and apparently the guilt of the wife will not bar an allowance to her.27
As for alimony and expenses pendente lite, there appears to be little left of the
former rules. As Section 1169 now authorizes temporary allowances to the wife,
whether she prosecutes or defends the action, it is obvious the former requirement
that forbade her denying the validity of the marriage no longer exists. Consequently
her guilt or innocence seems to be beside the point. Apparently all she need show is
that she is the plaintiff or defendant in an annulment action.
The further point has been raised that a constitutional question is involved-that
requiring a man to support a woman who is not his wife, may involve a denial of due
process.28 While the constitutionality of such statutes has not been decided in other
jurisdictions having similar laws on their statute books, situations may be imagined
where the question would be extremely close. When a wife enters into a bigamous
marriage and the innocent husband, later discovering the truth, brings suit for annul-
ment, it may well be carrying the statute too far to order him to support the "wife".
A closer case on the point of injustice, but involving the same constitutional problem,
is where both parties innocently contract a void or voidable marriage. As the statute
reads, alimony will be awarded the wife in both cases.
Whether the courts will so construe the statute must await their decision but the
language of the amendments seems to leave the courts little choice.
It should also be noted that Section 1169 as amended changes the rule of Farnham
v. Farnham..29 There relatives of a deceased husband brought an action to annul his
marriage. The court refused the wife temporary alimony and counsel fees on the
theory that the husbands death released him from the duty to support and conse-
quently she was not entitled to alimony. Section 1169 now provides that "When an
action for annulment is maintained after the death of the husband . . . " the court
may order the persons maintaining the action to "pay any sum or sums of money
necessary to enable the wife to defend the action."
EVIDENCE-COMPETENCE OF WITNESS TO TESTIFY AS TO TRANSACTION WITH DE-
CEASED IN AUTOMOBILE NEGLIGENCE CASES.-Section 347 of the Civil Practice Act in
broad terms prohibits a party or person interested in the event from testifying as to
any personal transaction or communication with a deceased or incompetent in a trial
in which the legal representative of such deceased or incompetent is a party.' A new
25. IA. CODE (1935) § 10491; ORE. CODE (1930) §§ 6-912, 6-914.
26. English Matrimonial Causes Act of 1907, 7 Edw. VII, Ch. 12.
27. Dunbar v. Dunbar, [1909] P. 90; LAw REmsioN ComanssioN, LEois. Doc. (1940)
No. 65 (H) 59.
28. Legis. (1940) 10 BaooxLYN L. Rrv. 96, 101-102.
29. 227 N. Y. 155, 124 N. E. 894_(1919).
1. For an analysis of the complete scope of § 347, see Matter of Christie, 167 Misc. 484,
4 N. Y. S. (2d) 484 (Surr. Ct. 1938); RicHARDsoN, EvmzucE (5th ed. 1936) §§ 462-470;
Goodman, The "From, Through or Under" Rule as to Competency of Witnesses (1940) 9
FoPR L. REv. 65.
19411
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paragraph was recently added to the end of this section providing in effect that a party
in an automobile case may testify to the circumstances of the accident where it
resulted in the death of another party and negligence is charged.2
The main provisions of Section 347 of the New York Act disqualifying one from
testifying to conversations or transactions with a decedent have counterparts in the
statute law of a majority of other jurisdictions.3 The object of these statutes is to
prevent a person who was, or might be assumed to be, a partisan witness from giving
his version of a transaction with another who was deceased and could not speak in
rebuttal. 4 If death has closed the lips of one party, the policy of the law is to close
the lips of the other.5
The statute has been severely criticised.6 Even assuming that the survivor would
perjure himself, his falsifying would have to be skillful enough to dupe the court, jury
and opposing counsel. The statute does not forbid disinterested persons from testify-
ing as to communications and transactions with the decedent. If human nature
is so degraded as to commit perjury as the statute recognizes, a party will not hesitate
to pay a "disinterested" witness for coming forward with such proof.7 In the face
of such growing criticism, the present amendment making an exception to the statute,
though it limits the exception to motor vehicle negligence cases and expressly dis-
qualifies any conversations with the decedent, is important as indicating a breach in
the dike. It is a possible forerunner of a more general abandonment of the rule.
Before the amendment, a question in automobile accident cases was whether or
not the fatal collision was a personal transaction as between the decedent and the
driver of the car and thus within the statutory prohibition. Some few states avoided
the question entirely and allowed the evidence in actions for wrongful death.8 A
2. "Nothing contained in this section, however, shall render a person incompetent to
testify as to the facts of an accident or the results therefrom where the proceeding, hearing,
defense or cause of action involves a claim of negligence or contributory negligence in an
action wherein one or more parties is the representative of the deceased or incompetent
person, based upon or by reason of, the operation or ownership of a motor vehicle being
operated upon the highways of the state, but this provision shall not be construed as per-
mitting testimony as to conversations with the deceased." N. Y. Laws 1940, c. 620, effective
September 1, 1940. See Saxe, Laws of 1940 Affecting Practice and Related Matters (1940)
12 N. Y. STATE BAR Ass'N BtLi. 86, 92.
3. See Legis. (1933) 46 HARv. L. Rav. 834 for a review of the various state statutes on the
subject.
4. Abbott v. Doughan, 204 N. Y. 223, 97 N. E. 599 (1912).
5. Louis v. Easton, 50 Ala. 471 (1873).
6. A committee of distinguished judges, practitioners and professors, appointed by the
Commonwealth Trust Fund of New York to inquire into the possibilities of reform in the
Rules of Evidence, recommended that the statute be abolished in favor of a permissory
type of statute such as Connecticut's [Com. Gan. STAT. (1930) §§ 5608-5609] permitting
the evidence to be admitted in the discretion of the court. See the Committee's report, THE
LAW or EVIDENCE: SosMM PROPOSALS FOR ITs REroPm (1927). The American Bar Associa-
tion's Committee on the Improvement of the Law of Evidence by a 46 to 3 vote also
recommended in 1938 the substitution of a statute which would allow evidence of transac-
tions or conversations with the decedent. 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 578 a.
7. Commonwealth Trust Fund Committee, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE: SoMM PROPOSALS FOR
ITS REROu (1927) 26.
8. Hale v. Kearly, 8 Baxt. 49 (Tenn. 1874); Mann v. Weiand, 81 Pa. 243 (1875);
[Vol. I0
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reason given was that such an action is not one involving the estate of the
deceased but is solely for the benefit of certain persons (the dead man's distributees)
as individuals. It is submitted that the deceased is not a party to the action in fact--
but only in name. New York however refused to allow the evidence in actions for
wrongful death.9
In several cases in New York concerning automobile accidents, an effort was made
to prove transactions involving the deceased. In the case of Trombly v. Deso,10 the
defendant was driving his car with' the plaintiff's intestate as a guest passenger when an
accident occurred resulting in the death of the guest. On trial the defendant sought
to prove-the contributory negligence of the decedent by his own evidence that he and
the decedent had been drinking and were intoxicated at the time of the accident.
The Appellate Division unanimously reversed the decision in defendant's favor on
the ground that his evidence as to the decedent's intoxication was clearly inadmissable
under Section 347 since the drinking "bout" was a personal transaction between the
defendant and the decedent.
A leading case in this state is McCarthy v. Woolston," an action by the administra-
tor of the deceased guest passenger against the defendant driver for negligence.
Details of the accident which involved another car were considered not to be part of a
personal transaction with the decedent and admissable. The cases are clearly dis-
tinguishable in that in the Trombly case the transaction objected to was with the
defendant, while in the McCarthy case the transaction sought to be shown was with a
third person, the driver of another car.
The obvious injustice of the Trombly case is heightened by the fact that by statute
in New York the burden of proving the decedent's contributory negligence is upon
the defendant.' 2 Hence if the accident is unwitnessed, the defendant is anomalously
given the burden of proof and at the same time prohibited from speaking in his own
defense. Such a situation in motor vehicle cases is now remedied by the statute.
The situation, where the defendant was the driver of one car and the decedent the
driver of another car or a pedestrian, has not been squarely presented in this state.
It seems clear, however, from analogous cases' 3 that such a collision would be'a
McEwen v. Springfield, 64 Ga. 159 (1879); Cincinnati, H. & I. R. R. v. Cregor, 150 Ind.
625, 50 N. E. 760 (1898) ; State v. Daues, 314 Mo. 13, 283 S. W. 51 (1926) ; Warfield Nat.
Gas Co. v. Clark, 257 Ky. 724, 79 S. W. 21 (1934).
9. Abelein v. Porter, 45 App. Div. 307, 61 N. Y. Supp. 144 (4th Dep't 18995.
10. 235 App. Div. 15, 256 N. Y. Supp. 225 (3d Dep't 1932). Accord: Lakin v. Wright,
230 App. Div. 330, 243 N. Y. Supp. 597 (4th Dep't 1930), where defendant tried to prove
decedent had not objected to fast driving. In Wisconsin in a similar situation, it was held
that the testimony of plaintiff guest that she objected to the speed of decedent's driving was
inadmissable. Waters v. Markham, 204 Wis. 322, 235 N. W. 797 (1931). But in a sub-
sequent case, the guest's testimony concerning the physical situation and the deceased
driver's movements and actions in operating the auto at the time of the accident was
held to be admissable . Krantz v. Krantz, 211 Wis. 249, 248 N. W. 155 (1933).
11. 210 App. Div. 152, 205 N. Y. Supp. 507 (4th Dep't 1924).
12. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 265. See also N. Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW § 131. Note
(1934) 19 CoRN. L. Q. 325, 331.
13. "The words of exclusion are as comprehensive as language can express: the transactions
and communications embrace every variety of affairs which can form the subject of
negotiation, intervieiws or actions between two persons, and include every method by which
one person can derive impressions or information from the conduct, condition or language
1941]
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personal transaction between the parties. This is also indicated by decisions on the
point in other states. A recent West Virginia case 14 held that the defendant motorist
and his wife were incompetent to testify as to the actions and movements of the
deceased because such actions and movements came within the statute barring
"personal transactions or communications" with the decedent.
Although disinterested witnesses may testify in such cases, the injustice of putting
the burden of proof on a possibly innocent driver in an unwitnessed accident and then
silencing him as to the acts of the decedent is now cured. There is no logical reason
why the exception should not be extended to all wrongful death actions whether due to
automobiles or not. The possibility of fraud or perjury is remote in such cases and
is counterbalanced by the objective of meting out justice to the living.
The present amendment should be easy of application and no problems of inter-
pretation are readily foreseeable. The present exception clearly allows witnesses to
testify to the facts of an accident involving the ownership or operation of a motor
vehicle where negligence or contributory negligence is claimed and one or more
parties to the action is the representative of the decedent or incompetent.
PRACTICE-SERVICE OF SUMMONS ON NON-RESIDENT NATURAL PERSON DOING Busi-
NESS IN THE STATE.-The new Section 229-b of the Civil Practice Act' provides
of another. The statute is a beneficial one and ought not to be limited or narrowed by
construction." Holcomb v. Holcomb, 95 N. Y. 316, 325 (1884).
In an action brought to recover for the death of a boy alleged to have been killed as a
result of an assault upon him by the defendant, it was held that the assault was a personal
transaction between defendant and decedent and hence defendant could not deny that he
kicked the boy to death. Abelein v. Porter, 45 App. Div. 307, 61 N. Y. Supp. 144 (4th
Dep't 1899). In an action against a dentist for malpractice for causing a tooth to drop into
the patient's windpipe causing her death, the defendant could not in a later action testify
as to his acts and conversations at the time. Minns v. Grossman, 118 Misc. 70, 193 N. Y.
Supp. 714 (Sup. Ct. 1922), aff'd 205 App. Div. 846, 198 N. Y. Supp. 933 (2d Dep't 1923).
14. Strode v. Dyer, 115 W. Va. 733, 177 S. E. 878 (1935), criticised in (1935) 41 W. VA.
L. Q. 256, but followed in Willhide v. Biggs, 118 W. Va. 160, 188 S. E. 876 (1936), which
recommended legislative change. Accord: Boyd v. Williams, 207 N. C. 30, 175 S. E. 832
(1934); South Natural Gas Co. v. Davidson, 225 Ala. 171, 142 So. 63 (1932); Van Meter
v. Goldfarb, 317 Ill. 620, 148 N. E. 391 (1925); Hudson v. Houser, 123 Ind. 309, 24 N. E.
243 (1890); Hallowach v. Priest, 113 Me. 510, 96 AtI. 146 (1915); Miller v. Walsh's Ad-
ministratrix, 240 Ky. 822, 43 S. W. (2d) 42 (1931).
Contra: Seligman v. Orth, 205 Wis. 199, 236 N. W. 115 (1931), an auto accident in which-
decedent drove one car and defendant witness the other and it was held not to be a personal
transaction. The court cited McCarthy v. Woolston, 210 App. Div. 152, 205 N. Y. Supp.
507 (4th Dep't 1924) as a New York case in point although in that case the decedent was
a guest rider of plaintiff. The difference in decision may be caused by the slight alteration
of words in the Wisconsin Statute which reads "transactions or communications by him
(D) personally with decedent". Wis. STAT. (1939) § 325.16.
In Rankin v. Morgan, 193 Ark. 771, 102 S. W. (2d) 552 (1937), the court held that the
auto accident was not a personal transaction and held personal transaction to mean a business
deal, an act involving buying and selling.
1. N. Y. LAws 1940, c. 99, effective September 1, 1940.
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that personal service of a summons and complaint on an agent within the state
transacting business for a non-resident individual defendant is effectual as personal
service on such defendant for any action arising within the state in relation to such
business. Previously a non-resident could not be personally' served unless, the action
was brought against a corporation, 2 joint-stock company or business trust,3 the action
arose as a result of a motor vehicle accident,4 or the non-resident was a real estate
broker or ,salesman.5 In these four statutory exceptions to the general rule the
Secretary of State is designated as agent for the service of process.
Almost sixty-five years ago the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that a
judgment affecting personal rights and obligations was void for lack of due process
if obtained without personal service on the defendant.9 However the court pointed
out in a dictum7 that there might be exceptions to this general rule. This dictum has
become the fountain head from which flowed the four statutory exceptions mentioned
above. These exceptions have been held constitutional on various grounds. In
Paul v. Virginia,8 it was held that a corporation was not a citizen within the meaning
of the privileges and immunities clause contained in Article 4, Section 2 of the United
States Constitution. Since this case it has been accepted without question that a
corporation can be barred or admitted at the will of a foreign state from doing business
within its territory. Therefore if admitted it must submit to all rules and regulations
imposed by the foreign jurisdiction. In this respect joint-stock associations and busi-
ness trusts are considered as entities and subject to regulation.9 Hence the exception
with reference to these entities is justified even though special regulations for service
of process on them are included.
Another exception is provided for non-resident motorists who are under obligation
to accept the Secretary of State as their agent for the service of process for accidents
occurring within the state. These statutory provisions for non-resident motorists have
been recognized by the United States Supreme Court'0 and are concededly constitutional
as a proper exercise of the police power of the state. There is an implied consent by
a non-resident motorist merely by his use of the highway, says the court, and there
is no discrimination against non-residents but they are put on the same footing as
residents, since both can be personally served.
The last exception deals with enterprises that are in need of regulation for the public
protection, and in order for a non-resident to participate, New York requires the
filing of an irrevocable consent to being personally served by service on the Secretary
2. N. Y. GEN. CoRP. LAW § 217.
3. N. Y. Gm. Ass'I LAW § 19.
4. N. Y. VEmscE AND TRAmc LAW § 52.
5. N. Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 442 (g).
6. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877).
7. Id. at 735. "Neither de we mean to assert that a state may not require a non-resident
entering into a partnership or association within its limits, or making contracts enforceable
there, to appoint an agent or representative in the state to receive service of process and
notice in legal proceedings instituted with respect to such partnership, association, or contracts,
or to designate such place that service may be made upon a public officer designated for
that purpose, or in some other prescribed way, and that judgments rendered upon such
service may not be binding upon the non-residents both within and without the state."
8. 8 Wall. 168 (U. S. 1868).
9. Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U. S. 537 (1928).
10. Hess v. Paulowski, 274 U. S. 352 (1927).
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of State. This regulation was approved in Doherty v. Goodman.1  The court held
that an Iowa statute treating the business of dealing in corporate securities as ex-
ceptional was constitutional and the business was rightfully subjected to special super-
vision. Thus New York's treatment of real estate brokers and salesmen as engaged
in an exceptional business would undoubtedly be sustained under the authority of the
Doherty Case.'
2
Will the new exception meet with the same fortunate treatment? Despite the fact
that a majority of states13 have held similar provisions unconstitutional, the New
York Law Revision Commission recommended the new section with the belief of its
constitutionality.14 To be constitutional the Civil Practice Act section must be
consistent with the "privileges and immunities"'15 and "due process"'16 clauses of the
Federal Constitution. As to the first requirement, the United States Supreme Court
has held that only fundamental rights of citizenship are protected and the states must
not necessarily assure non-residents precisely the same rights as residents.17 It would
seem that this statute goes no further than many other statutes which establish
various discriminations on the basis of residence. These statutes were sustained as
constitutional.' 8 For example different statutes of limitations as applied to non-
residents or taxing a non-resident decedent's estate. They are not held discriminations
but rather a reasonable attempt by the state to protect itself as well as its citizens.
It has even been argued that the immunity of non-residents from judgments in
personam is a discrimination against residents. 19 As to the second requirement of due
process it would seem from previous decisions of the United States Supreme Court that
the essential elements of due process are sufficient notice of the proceedings and
ample opportunity to defend.20 The statute under consideration gives the non-
11. 294 U. S. 623 (1935). This case did much to explain the trouble caused by the
decision in Flexner v. Farson, 248 U. S. 289 (1918). The latter case was understood as
holding that a partnership consisting of individuals could not, like a corporation, be excluded
from doing business in a state and therefore couldn't be deemed to have consented to a service-
statute in advance. But this later case pointed out that the agency had been terminated
in the Flexner case supra, changing the entire aspect of the case, for if there was no
agency, of course the partners weren't properly served and the ruling in the Flexner case
supra, was not what was first supposed.
12. LAW REvisioN Co-ssioN, Legis. Doc. (1940) No. 65 (D) 32-33.
13. Constitutional: Edwards v. Glove, 47 Ind. App. 347, 94 N. E. 596 (1911); Davidson
v. Doherty, 214 Iowa 739, 241 N. W. 700 (1932); Stoner v. Higginson, 316 Pa. 481, 175 Atl.
527 (1934).
Unconstitutional: Caldwell v. Armour, 1 Penne. Rep. 545, 43 Atl. 517 (Del. 1899);
Hitchens v. Bennett, 339 Ill. 366, 171 N. E. 562 (1930); Martin v. Bryant, 108 Me. 253, 80
At. 702 (1911); Cabanne v. Graf, 87 Minn. 510, 92 N. W. 461 (1902); Knox Bros. v.
E. W. Wagner & Co., 141 Tenn. 348, 209 S. W. 638 (1919).
14. LAW REVrsioN CoialiSSxoN, Legis. Doc. (1940) No. 65 (D) 7.
15. U. S. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 2.
16. U. S. CoNsT. A=m . XIV, § 1.
17. Canadian Northern Ry. Co. v. Eggen, 252 U. S. 553 (1920); Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250
U. S. 525 (1919); Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 207 U. S. 142 (1907); Blake v.
McClung, 172 U. S. 239 (1898).
18. Idem.
19. Howe, Advantages of a Non-Resident Conducting an Unincorporated Business in
Illinois (1919) 14 ILL. L. Rxv. 189, 191.
20. Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U. S. 362, 369 (1930); Simon v. Craft, 182 U. S. 427 (1901).
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resident reasonable notice and opportunity to defend. As far as the notice is concerned,
this method of direct service on the agent may often be a better method of informing
him of the action than the service by publication of in rem jurisdiction. The con-
stitutionality of the new Civil Practice Act Section 229-b cannot be based on the
ground that it regulates extraordinary business, for this section deals with any
business. 21
This section protects parties where their adversaries' property is not located within
the state and jurisdiction in rem is unavailable. The act was intended inter alia to
facilitate the operation of the injunction in support of the Fair Trade Act.22 A non-
resident who disobeyed such trade regulations through business agents within the state
could not be reached, for jurisdiction could not be obtained. Equity could not render
its decree in personam without personal service.
At first glance the statute seems broad enough to cover the case of a non-resident
who personally transacts business within the state and permits him to be Served by
leaving a copy of the summons and complaint "with the person in charge of such
business within this state". The statute does not specifically exclude this possibility.
However, permitting such service would be unwarranted. This plainly was not the
intent of the legislature. He may be personally served since he is regularly here on
business. Thus he is within the' jurisdiction and resort to the substitute method
provided by Section 229-b 23 should not be permitted.
Also despite the recent date of Section 229-b, it has already been pointed out2
4
that service on a partner under Civil Practice Act Section 229-a is of less serious
consequence than service on an agent for the partnership under Section 229-b, and that
there should be some equalization. Under the older section the separate individual
property of only the partners personally served within the state would be liable to the
judgment, while under the recent statute personal service on the partners is no longer
necessary. The separate property of all the partners would be liable by service
on the agent within the state.
REAL PROPERTY-RECORDING or EXECUTORY CONTRACTS FOR THE SALE OF REAL
PROPERTY.-A recent amendment to Section 294 of the Real Property Law1 pro-
vides, in effect, that recording an executory contract for the sale of real property shall
21. Note (1935) 33 Mcr. L. RZv. 963.
22. N. Y. LAws 1935, c. 976.
23. N. Y. Crv. PRAc. ACr § 225. See Jacobson v. Krekell, 223 App. Div. 440, 228 N. Y.
Supp. 371 (1st Dep't 1928); Ives v. Darling, 210 App. Div. 521, 206 N. Y. Supp. 493 (3d
Dep't 1924); O'Connell v. Gallagher, 104 App. Div. 492, 93 N. Y. Supp. 643 (Ist Dep't 1905).
24. Prashker, Service of Summons on Non-Resident Natural Persons Doing Business in
New York (1940) 15 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 1, 22 et seq.
1. N. Y. Laws 1940, c. 745, § 1; N. Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 294, after stating that
an executory contract for the sale, purchase or exchange of real property may now be
recorded goes on to provide that: "Every executory contract for the sale, purchase or
exchange of real property not so recorded shall be void as against any person who subse-
quently purchases or acquires by exchange or contracts to purchase or acquire by exchange,
in good faith and for a valuable consideration, the same real property or any portion
thereof, from the same vendor, his distributees or devisees, and whose conveyance or
contract is first duly recorded".
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constitute constructive notice to all subsequent purchasers and incumbrancers of the
existence of the vendee's prior interest in the land. Thus recording such a contract
is now given the same effect as recording a deed or mortgage.
2
It is a general rule in equity that the purchaser of an interest in real property, for
value and without notice of any prior equity, takes the property free from that
equity, whether it be a trust, an equitable lien or any other right enforceable in
equity alone.3 On the other hand, the purchaser of an interest in land who does
not give value or who has notice of any outstanding equities will take subject to
those equities. 4
Another general rule is that on making an executory contract for the sale of realty
before conveyance of the land the vendee obtains, in equity, a lien thereon for any
payment which he has made upon the purchase price.5 This vendee's lien is a form
of equitable mortgage. 6 Equity, regarding as done that which ought to be done,
thereafter considers the equitable estate as being vested in the purchaser and the
vendor is regarded as holding the legal title in trust for the benefit of the vendee,
while the vendee is regarded as the trustee of the vendor for the unpaid purchase
money.7 Since the purchaser upon the making of an executory contract for the
sale of real property is the equitable owner of the property,8 he would have priority
as against a subsequent transferee of an interest in the same real property, if such
subsequent taker had notice of the prior equity or if he took without value.9 It is
therefore important that some form of notice be given the subsequent grantee and
that the law make provision therefor.
2. N. Y. REA PROPERTY LAW § 291.
3. 2 PomTaoy, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) § 767; 5 Tn iANY, RIEAL PROP-
ERTz (3d ed. 1939) §§ 1260, 1261; Conn v. Boutwell, 101 Miss. 353, 58 So. 105 (1912);
Warnock v. Harlow, 96 Cal. 298, 31 Pac. 166 (1892); Carlisle v. jumper, 81 Ky. 282
(1883); Sengfelder v. Hill, 21 Wash. 371, 58 Pac. 250 (1899).
4. For a discussion of what constitutes a subsequent purchaser without notice and a
purchaser for value, see WALsir, LAW OF PROPERTY (2d ed. 1927) §§ 340, 341. For a com-
prehensive study of the question of notice, see 2 POMEROY, EQUrrY Ju IsRUDENCE (4th
ed. 1918) §§ 591-676.
5. 2 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (13th ed. 1886) § 1217; 3 POMEROY, EQUITY JURIs-
PRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) § 1263; Stults v. Brown, 112 Ind. 370, 14 N. E. 230 (1887);
Galbreath v. Reeves, 82 Tex. 357, 18 S. W. 696 (1891); Elterman v. Hyman, 192 N. Y.
113, 84 N. E. 937 (1908) holding that a vendee of land, under an executory contract to
buy, has a lien on the land for the amount paid on the purchase price although not in
possession.
6. 2 REEVE, REAL PROPERTY (1909) § 745. For a brief discussion of the different
kinds of equitable mortgages, see REEVw, op. cit. supra §§ 738-750.
7. 2 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDECE (13th ed. 1886) § 790; 1 PERRY, TRUSTS (6th ed.
1911) §§ 122-231; Baldwin v. McDonald, 24 Wyo. 108, 156 Pac. 27 (1916); Williams v.
Haddock, 145 N. Y. 144, 39 N. E. 825 (1895); Olds v. Little Creek Cattle Co., 22 Wyo.
331, 140 Pac. 1004 (1914); Abbott v. Moldestad, 74 Minn. 293, 77 N. W. 227 (1898).
8. In Brownell v. Board of Education, 239 N. Y. 369, 373, 146 N. E. 630, 632 (1923),
the court quoting from Millville Aerie v. Weatherby, 82 N. J. Eq. 455, 88 Atl. 847 (1913)
said: "As purchaser under a valid contract of purchase vendee became the equitable owner
of the property; in equity the property is regarded as belonging to him, the vendor re-
taining the legal title simply as trustee and as security for the unpaid purchase money."
9. See notes 3 and 4 supra.
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If the first purchaser had a deed to the land, he could in New York protect him-
self against any subsequent purchaser for value and without actual notice by record-
ing his deed before the subsequent purchaser's deed was recorded.'L The recording
of any deed is held to be constructive notice to every subsequent purchaser of the
existence and contents of the instrument, irrespective of whether the record title
was actually examined to obtain such information. 11
Although a vendee under an executory contract of sale is entitled to as much
protection as against subsequent purchasers as the law affords a vendee having a deed,
until the enactment of this amendment, such a purchaser was protected against sub-
sequent purchasers for value, only if the subsequent purchaser had actual notice of
the prior executory contract. While the former law12 permitted the recording of
such executory contracts, in construing it the courts held that such recording did
not give constructive notice to subsequent purchasers.' 3 On the other hand, one
who searched the records and saw the executory contract was held to have actual
notice.14 Thus the only value in recording an executory contract was to provide a
means of giving subsequent purchasers actual notice.
Under Section 294, before it was amended, the only certain nfethod of giving
constructive notice to subsequent purchasers was to start an action for specific per-
formance.15 Then under Section 120 of the Civil Practice Act the plaintiff could
file a notice of the pendency of his action, 16 the effect of which filing would be to
10. N. Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 290 (1), (2), § 291.
11. 2 PommoY, EQUITY JuRisPPRuDENcE (4th ed. 1918) § 649; WALSH, LAw OF PROP-
ERTY (2d ed. 1927) § 436. The recording acts thus construed are made to involve an
application and extension of the doctrine that a subsequent purchaser with notice of a
prior equity takes subject to such equity. WALsi, LAW OF PROPERTY (2d ed. 1927) § 476.
For a legislative and judicial history of Section 291 of the Real Property Law, see Hatcher
v. Brunt, 89 Misc. 530, 153 N. Y. Supp. 707 (Sup. Ct. 1915).
12. Before being amended, N. Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 294 merely provided that "An
executory contract for the sale or purchase of real property, ...may be recorded by the
recording officer of any county in which any of the real property to which it relates is
situated".
13. In construing this section, the courts have said that "the only effect of recording
the contract is to preserve the evidence and facilitate the proof. It in no other way affects
the rights of the parties. The record of such contract would not be constructive notice
to subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers." Boyd v. Schlesinger, 59 N. Y. 301, 309
(1874).
14. Schultz & Son v. Nelson, 256 N. Y. 473, 476, 177 N. E. 9, 11 (1931); The Bank for
Savings v. Frank, 56 How. Prac. 403 (N. Y. 1879); Washburn v. Burnham, 63 N. Y. 132
(1875); Boyd v. Schlesinger, 59 N. Y. 301 (1874); Merithew v. Andrews, 44 Barb. 201(N. Y. 1865):
15. Bruce v. Tilson, 25 N. Y. 194, 198 (1862). The vendee has the right to apply to
the court of equity for specific performance of his executory contract. He would lose his
suit as the vendor has not yet defaulted and be charged with costs, but the Us pendens
would have been filed.
16. The doctrine of notice of Us pendens extends to all equitable suits which involve the
tifle to a specific tract of land, or which are brought to establish any equitable estate, in-
terest, or right in an identified parcel of land, or to enforce any lien, charge or encum-
brance upon land. Mansur & Tibbet Implement Co. v. Beer, 19 Texas Civ. App. 311,
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provide constructive notice to all subsequent purchasers or incumbrancers of the
property in question.17 The difficulty with this method of providing constructive
notice was that it subjected the purchaser to great expense in paying attorney fees.
Further, the commencement of such an action would tend to create animosity
between the parties and destroy their faith and confidence in each other. Hence,
the method was seldom resorted to.
This amendment by providing, in effect, that the recording of an executory contract
for the sale of real property will serve as constructive notice to all subsequent pur-
chasers furnishes a means whereby purchasers under executory contracts may easily
protect themselves.' 8
However, it is interesting to note that this amendment has left open the problem
as to whether the recording of an executory contract to sell land, will constitute
actual notice of a vendee's equitable lien to subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers
who search and find the record after the closing date. For example, on January 1, X,
the owner, contracts to sell land to A for $1,000. The closing is to take place on
February 1. A makes a down payment of $100, thus acquiring an equitable lien
on the property to the extent of his down payment. On the same day, the executory
contract is recorded. On March 1, B, who is about to take title to the same land
from X, searches the record, and finds the record of this contract. Thereafter, B
takes title to the property. The question now arises as to whether B took the prop-
erty free from, or subject to A's equitable lien. Section 294 of the Real Property
Law, as amended, provides that the recording of an executory contract for the sale
of land "shall be effective up to and including the day fixed by the contract for the
conveyance of title". This may mean that the record shall not be effective as con-
structive notice after the closing date, but it is not clear whether the record will be
45 S. W. 972 (1898); Andres v. Hancock, 128 Misc. 800, 221 N. Y. Supp. 80 (Sup. Ct.
1927).
17. N. Y. Civ. PrAc. AcT § 121. A Us pendens is constructive notice of the action to all
subsequent purchasers from or incumbrancers against the defendant with respect to whom
it is indexed. Freedman v. Safran, 131 App. Div. 675, 116 N. Y. Supp. 113 (1st Dep't
1909); Sheridan v. Andrews, 49 N. Y. 478, aff'g 3 Lans. 129 (N. Y. 1872); Chapman v.
West, 174 N. Y. 125 (1858).
18. In order to bring the law relating to the recording of sales contracts in conformity
with the law relating to the recording of mortgages and deeds, the legislature at the same
time amended Sections 291, 315 and 316 of the Real Property Law. N. Y. Laws 1940, c.
745 §§ 1, 2.
Section 291 was amended to provide that the vendee of an executory contract to buy
land, who has first duly recorded the contract, prevails over a grantee to whom the vendor
has previously deeded or mortgaged the property and who has failed to record his deed or
mortgage.
Section 315 was amended to provide that the recording officer of each county must
record in his books all executory contracts for the sale, purchase or exchange of real
property that are delivered to him to be so recorded.
Section 316 was also amended to provide that the recording officer of each county must
provide proper books for making general indices of instruments recorded in his office.
There must be one set of indices for mortgages or securities in the nature of mortgages;
and another set for conveyances, and executory contracts for the sale, purchase, or ex-




effective as actual notice to one who searches and finds the record after the closing
date. Perhaps the answer depends upon whether this record was sufficient to put B,
a reasonable man, on inquiry and thus charge him with the facts a reasonable inquiry
would have disclosed; or whether it was reasonable for him to assume that X had
returned the $100 to A, (or that the parties have otherwise settled the matter) in
view of the fact that no notice of lis pendens is filed against the property, which
notice would be filed if X had not settled the matter, and if A had commenced an
action against X. This problem presents a decidedly close question, which may have
to be solved by the courts. However, it seems that ordinary prudence would dictate
that in such a situation B should be put on inquiry to determine whether A's lien
has been settled, and thus be charged with all the facts a reasonable inquiry would
have disclosed.
Another problem exists. Assume that in January X contracted to sell land to A,
closing to take place on February 1, and A made a down payment of $100. A
memorandum of the transaction is recorded, which merely contained the names of
the parties, the time fixed by the contract for the conveyance of title and a descrip-
tion of the property, as required by Section 294 as amended. But the down pay-
ment of $100 is not included therein. On February 1, A, suspecting that X's title
is unmarketable, refuses to take title. X fails to return the $100 to A. On March 1,
B takes title from X, having seen this memorandum on the record. Now A seeks
to enforce his equitable lien against the property. Can it be said that the record
of such memorandum is sufficient to put B on actual notice of A's equitable lien?
The courts may have to determine whether actual notice of the memorandum is
sufficient to put a reasonable man on inquiry to determine whether A made a down
payment when the executory contract was executed. It seems that in such a situa-
tion, the duty of a reasonable man to make an inquiry is less than in the former
situation. Here B does not know that a down payment has been made. However,
as a reasonable man he might be required to take notice of the fact that in the
ordinary case a down payment is usually made.
This situation might have been in the contemplation on the Law Revision Com-
mission which recommended the present amendment. 19 In 1937, the Commission
recommended a bill making the recording of a sales contract constructive notice of
the vendee's interest for a period of ninety days from the time fixed by the contract
for conveyance of title.20 This bill passed the Assembly but did not pass the Senate.
It had been objected that the provisions making recording effective after the date
set for conveyancing might operate as an impediment to free conveyancing. This
provision has been omitted from the amendment under consideration, but these prob-
lems seem to persist.
19. LAw REmISoN CoinssioN, LEIs. Doc. (1940) No. 65 (E).
20. LAw REVIsIoN CommissIoN, LEGis. Doc. (1937) No. 65 (N).
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